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MODERN CORPORATE CHANGES: REINSTATING THE 
LINK BETWEEN THE NATURE, BOUNDARIES AND 
GOVERNANCE OF THE FIRM 
 
Abstract 
The theory of the firm and corporate governance are two fields of analysis traditionally 
tackled separately in the economic literature. This paper seeks to rediscover the link between 
the nature, boundaries and governance of the firm on the basis of changes in corporate 
industrial firms. We advance the argument that, to understand the human capital-intensive 
firm, this analytical interconnection should be restored. On the basis of Critical Resource 
Theory, we present an innovative vision of the nature, boundaries and governance of firms 
whose productive activity is built around its key partners’ human capital. The organisational 
mode of governance has changed linked to a renewed conception of the firm. What we term 
the ‘multi-resources’ model of governance of the firm depends on an original representation 
of the structure, organisation and power relationships of modern firms, whose value arises 
from the accumulation of specific human capital. Consequently, the multi-resources model 
involves hybrid governance instrument in order to protect the integrity of the human capital-
intensive firm. 
 
JEL Classification: J 24, J 41, L 22, L 23 




Publication in 1937 of the ‘Nature of the Firm’ by Coase and The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property by Berle & Means in 1932, gave rise to two distinct fields of analysis. On 
the one hand, Coase’s article gave birth to an abundant literature on the nature and the 
boundaries of the firm. Debates on the emergence of the firm in a market economy, and the 
possibility to distinguish it from cooperation and price coordination stem from this reference 
work (Williamson, 1975, 1985; Klein et al., 1978). On the other hand, Berle & Means’s book 
was the beginning of questions about corporate governance. The Modern Business 
Corporation is characterised by a separation between ownership and control, a separation that 
generates conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers, which are solved by 




Since the mid 1980s, an increasingly large portion of the value of firms has become 
attributable to intangible assets – including specialised human capital (competencies, 
knowledge, experience, etc. of employees) – that cannot be appropriated (Teece, 2000; Hall, 
2001, Brynjolfsson et al., 2002). Basically, both recent financial and technological 
developments, and industrial restructuring, have induced major changes in the nature, the 
hierarchical structure, the work organisation and also in the internal regulation of firms. These 
changes cannot be explained either only by the Modern Theory of the Firm or only by 
corporate governance analysis. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore attempts to reconcile these two fields of 
analysis that traditionally have been separate, by considering the transition from the physical 
to the human capital-intensive firm. This paper restores the link between the nature, 
boundaries and governance of the firm, which is not very well documented in the literature 
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(Bolton & Scharfstein, 1998). It is not possible to completely answer the Coasian question 
relating to the existence and the boundaries of the firm without understanding the corporate 
governance issues raised by Berle & Means in their book. Reciprocally, it is not possible to 
have a complete understanding of the general system by which firms are owned and managed, 
discussed by Berle & Means, without having some notion of what a firm is, i.e. neglecting 
Coase’s perspective. 
 
This paper considers corporate governance as a system of power relationships between 
the different corporate members that own the resources fundamental to the productive entity. 
This general definition of corporate governance refers to a vision of the firm as a combination 
of specific and critical resources (Penrose, 1959; Aoki, 1984; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; 
Barney, 1991; Rajan & Zingales, 1998) and, thus raises the age-old question of what a firm is 
(Zingales, 1998). In other words, we suggest that it is impossible to study the governance of 
an organisation whose nature and boundaries are not defined. And, the way a firm is governed 
changes with the way its nature and its boundaries are characterised. 
 
The link between the two fields of analysis needs to be restored in order to understand 
the modern human capital-intensive firm, for instance, a large proportion of the new service 
companies.
2
 This is justified by the increased importance of human assets in economic 
activity. Business services activities are a significant and growing part of modern economies. 
The services sector now accounts for over 70% of total employment and value added in the 
OECD economies (OECD, 2005). This indicates that firms built around employees’ resources 
produce 70% of the added-value in the sector. These data suggest that it is human capital 
rather than physical capital that boosts economic growth. 
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The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 highlights the merits of the link between 
how to define the firm and corporate governance. In this perspective, we emphasise the 
seminal developments of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the importance of focusing 
on the organisational history of industrial firms. Section 3 shows that some more recent essays 
that have tried to analyse the transition of firms to entities based on their human assets 
(Critical Resource Theory - CRT), extend the definition of the boundaries and coordinating 
role of the firm. Because of the immaterial and non-transferable nature of human capital, the 
way one deals with corporate governance issues has to be reconsidered by overtaking the 
restrictive duality between shareholder value versus stakeholder value. Thus, we propose an 
original investigation of the principles and mechanisms of governance of the human capital-
intensive firm. The acquisition, the allocation and the exercise of power, on the one hand, and 
hold-up problems related to human capital, on the other, are at the core of what we term the 
‘multi-resources’ governance of the firm. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The link between the Modern Theory of the Firm and corporate governance: 
Theoretical and historical evidence 
Power and coordination are at the core of the articulation of corporate governance in the 
theory of the firm (2.1.). This articulation is all the more evident if one explores the latest 
changes concerning the nature and the boundaries of the firm linked to the growing 
importance of human capital (2.2.). 
 
2.1. Coordination and power in the theory of the firm 
Nowadays, economic analysis seems to conceal the complementary vision between the theory 
of the firm and corporate governance. It is a link that is missing, insofar as this link has 
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existed since the origins of the Modern Theory of the Firm. Indeed, the premises of the 
relationship between the two fields of analysis date back to the seminal work of Coase (1937) 
and the foundation of TCE. 
 
TCE: The origins of the analytical link. 
Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) bases the existence of the firm on informational market 
imperfections. The price system fails to effectively coordinate economic activities: it induces 
the costs of discovering prices, but also introduces negotiation costs and the costs of 
controlling contracts. In this context, hierarchical organisations would be able to minimise 
these transaction costs due to productive activities: within the firm, the allocation of resources 
by authority, represented by the entrepreneur-coordinator, is a more efficient mechanism even 
if it creates some organisation costs. Within the same framework, the notions of ‘transaction 
costs’ and ‘authority’ and their conceptual combination establish the dichotomic vision 
between ‘make’ and ‘buy’. 
 
In TCT, transaction costs are linked to asset specificity, and since contracts are 
incomplete, economic agents, who are opportunist by nature, are incited to make use of the 
weaknesses of contracts without necessarily taking into account the interests of the firm. In 
other words, contractual incompleteness generates hold-up risks. This inimical behaviour 
discourages the party subject to possible expropriation from making specific investments 
critical to the contractual relationship, and can cause inefficiencies during renegotiation 
(Klein et al., 1978). On the basis of these developments, TCT proposes a preliminary 
approach of power relationships between corporate members. Within hierarchies, the 
authority of the employer over the employees is the central mechanism of coordination 
(Williamson, 1975). The firm is the governance structure
3
 able to prevent hold-up risks. More 
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precisely, Zingales (1998, p.500), in the spirit of Williamson (1985), defines ‘a governance 
system as the complex set of constraints that shape the ex-post bargaining over the quasi-rents 
generated in the course of a relationship’. 
 
Although TCT represents a robust approach to the boundaries of the firm, some 
confusion remains as far as the definition of the firm is concerned: the concepts of hierarchy 
(even through vertical integration)
4
 and authority are put on the same level (Baudry & Gindis, 
2004). 
 
Nevertheless, this approach can be considered to be a more relevant foundation for the 
link between the nature, the boundaries and the governance of the firm. Some authors 
continue to support Agency Theory as the unique theory of the firm providing a foundation 
for dealing with corporate governance objectives and practices. However, by defining the firm 
as a combination of explicit inter-individual contracts, Agency Theory does not clearly 
distinguish between hierarchical transactions and market transactions (Eisenberg, 1999). 
Although it provides some interesting prescriptions as far as incentives and control 
mechanisms are concerned, Agency Theory is not a theory of the firm theory, i.e. it fails to 
provide any insights into the boundaries of the firm. 
 
In considering transaction costs and authority in the frame of microeconomics applied 
to industrial organisation, the economic literature has investigated corporate governance 
issues on the basis of hold-up problems, while dealing with the institutional division of 
labour. Incomplete Contracts Theory (ICT) is proposed as a revised and formalised 
conception of the transactional approach. ICT develops a vision of the firm based on its 
physical assets, whose ownership raises the problem of the management of hold-up threats. 
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ICT: Hold-up and asset ownership. 
In line with the developments of TCT, ICT explains that transactions costs are due to hold-up 
risks induced by under-investment. It focuses on efficiency considerations and incentive 
structures to deal with hold-up problems. ICT considers ownership as the unique way to 
address potential hold-ups and incentive alignments in a world of incomplete contracting and 
divergent interests (Holmstrom & Roberts, 1998); ownership is the solution to regulating 
power relationships between agents that participate in productive transactions (Grossman & 
Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990). 
 
In other words, ICT views the firm as a collection of physical assets that are 
commonly owned, whose main governance objective is to satisfy the owners’ interests. The 
boundaries of the firm are clearly defined by the legal perimeter of the productive entity; 
physical assets ownership delimits the boundaries of the firm. Hold-up problems can be 
solved on the basis of an optimal allocation of residual rights of control: residual rights of 
control must be granted to a unique agent, i.e. to a unique authority. Governance structures 
allow the owner to take decisions not specified in the initial contract (Hart, 1995). In this 
context, efficiency, legal ownership and asset specificity are at the core of corporate 
governance considerations and the objective is to save on transactions costs and to maximise 
the value for the owner. 
 
Moreover, ICT overlooks the importance of human capital; human capital is always 
subordinated to the development of firm-specific fixed capital (Hart, 1989; Klein, 1991). Yet, 
within ICT, some authors have tried to overcome the restrictive conception of the firm as a 
unified structure of property rights (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Combining the theory of 
 9 
incentives and TCT, they take account of the importance of resource complementarities. 
Milgrom & Roberts (1995, p.181) state that complementarity means ‘doing more of one thing 
[and] increases the return from doing more of another’. 
 
Complementarities between productive resources are at the core of the firm. 
Consequently, hold-up threats can originate in the human capital of each productive corporate 
partner.
5
 Power relationships and corporate governance mechanisms have to be reconsidered 
on the basis of this central dimension. In fact, human capital is one of the main factors in the 
changing nature, boundaries and governance of corporate industrial firms. 
 
2.2. Changes in the structure, organisation, and internal regulation of industrial corporate 
firms: Historical evidence 
Since the middle of the twentieth century, the structure and the organisation of the firm, and 
the way that relationships between different partners are managed, have changed.  
 
Created to exploit scale and scope economies, the Modern Business Corporation, 
which is physical capital intensive and vertically integrated, dominated until the 1980s. The 
boundaries of big corporation are clearly defined by the legal ownership of the physical 
assets, and the main corporate governance issue is to control managers’ behaviour to protect 
external investors (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The emergence of the human capital-intensive 
firm in the 1990s, and its growing role in the economic system, have tended to question the 
managerial configuration of the Modern Business Corporation and its corresponding 
shareholding mode of corporate governance. In other words, the transition from the Modern 
Business Corporation to the human capital-intensive firm marks a break in the way that the 
boundaries and firm governance can be understood. The missing link between the two fields 
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of analysis cannot be discussed only on the basis of the ‘managerial revolution’ in the large, 
hierarchical, multidivisional business corporation (Chandler, 1977). 
 
Recent industrial reorganisations based on large movements in terms of vertical 
disintegration (Langlois, 2003; Leiblein & Miller, 2003; Jacobides, 2005), and also 
technological innovations
6
 and globalisation of finance, imply that productive activity does 
not require only traditional production factors such as fixed capital. Productive activity also 
requires competences, human capital, organisational structures and procedures, and all the 
other resources described as intangible assets (Brynjolfsson et al., 2002, p.137). 
Employees are crucial resources for innovative firms (Hall, 2000; Lund Vinding, 2006). In 
this dynamic context, workers enhance their value as differentiated human assets that use 
physical tools optimally (Zingales, 2000). Human capital has become more important than 
physical capital for productive activities. Indeed, on the basis of know how, knowledge, 
behaviour and the attributes that affect individual capabilities, i.e. adaptability, initiative, 
motivation, etc., employees represent specialised human capital that is essential for the firm to 
exploit growth opportunities. This human capital represents a critical resource for the 
production processes of firms (Kochan & Rubinstein, 2000). The level of knowledge, skills 
and capabilities attained by employees is an important source of economic value for the firm 
(Becker, 1976). According to Blair (1995, p.292) ‘A knowledge company’s primary resource 
and principal competitive advantage is the knowledge that its employees possess’. 
 
Moreover, for Charreaux & Desbrières (2001), a firm creates value because it owns 
key competences difficult to imitate, e.g. skills linked to human or organisational capital 
rather than financial capital. Thus, faced with industrial mutations, firms will choose to 
globally manage the competencies of their employees. 
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In this context, the stakeholder model,
7
 which recognises the strategic nature of human 
capital as far as rent creation is concerned (Coff, 1999), has been developed. Unlike the 
shareholder model, which focuses on satisfying investors’ interests by monitoring managers’ 
behaviour, the stakeholder model aims to avoid conflicts by disciplining stakeholders
8
 and 
particularly managers. In other words, the stakeholder model is framed by multiple principal-
agent relationships (Hill & Jones, 1992; Laffont & Martimort, 1997). Thus, (like the 
shareholder model) it is based on a vision of the firm as a ‘nexus of contracts’, which operates 




Nevertheless, because human capital cannot be legally appropriated, the approach of the 
firm has to be re-founded (Blair, 1999; Araujo et al., 2003). Similarly, the power invested in 
human capital must take account of the intangible and inalienable nature of this critical asset. 
As the importance of human capital has increased, power is no longer concentrated only 
within top management, although this latter may have the residual rights of control. Power, 
instead, is dispersed among all stakeholders, who are valuable resources. The boundaries of 
the human capital-intensive firm are not clearly delimited by its legal perimeter. The 
boundaries of the human capital-intensive firm have to be defined in an extended way, in 
functional terms, and the governance of the firm has to be revised. 
 
3. The boundaries and the governance of the human capital-intensive firm 
Human capital needs to be introduced as a key dimension in firm analysis. Its role and its 
effects must be discussed in line with the dominant contractual framework, that is, ICT (3.1.). 
In this perspective, CRT develops conceptual innovations to set up an original approach to the 
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human capital-intensive firm while suggesting an adapted re-examination of the 
corresponding modes of the exercise of authority and power (3.2.). 
 
3.1. Human capital and hold-up: Extending ICT 
In ICT, power based on specific human assets does not change the incentive coordination 
problem; ICT initially overshadows the assumption of hold-up problems due to firm-specific 
human capital owned by individual members. 
 
However, property rights (on physical assets) are not sufficient to guarantee incentive 
complementarity (Holmström & Roberts, 1998; Holmström, 1999). Human capital takes on 
intrinsic importance, beyond its combination with physical capital advanced by ICT. For this 
reason, the vision of the firm as a ‘legal fiction’ cannot efficiently coordinate investments. 
 
Human capital can be appropriated neither by the firm nor by any of the firm’s 
partners. Indeed, an agent cannot transfer its residual rights of control on its human capital to 
others through an incomplete contract, for an extended period (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart 
& Moore, 1990). Human capital is inalienable such that contracts for its management do not 
give the same residual rights of control as contracts relating to physical capital (Gibbons, 
2005). Consequently, the authority relationship between employer and employee, as described 
by Coase (1937) and Simon (1951, p.294), needs to be reviewed. Basically, ‘In the 
employment relationship, whoever possesses legal control over the firm’s assets has the 
authority’ (Morroni, 2006, p.208). 
 
But, whoever possesses legal control over the firm’s assets cannot fully control human 
capital – because of its non-appropriable nature – even if employment contracts spell out the 
 13 
legal rights as ‘the right of employees to quit’ (Baron & Kreps, 1999, p.66). The employment 
relationship is affected in favour of the specialised employee whose specific human capital 
strengthens his or her negotiating power. Thus, corporate governance issues, i.e. power 
relationships and underlying control and incentive systems, cannot be solved solely on the 
basis of ownership. Therefore, firms built around the partners’ human capital cannot be 
satisfactorily defined in terms of the legal structure of property rights. The focus on the theory 
of the firm must shift to studying the economic and functional nature of organisations (Rajan 
& Zingales, 2001; Baudry & Gindis, 2004). The vision of the firm as a combination of 
physical assets, commonly owned, must be abandoned for an improved conception of the firm 
based on the specialisation of assets decisive to the productive activity of the firm, notably 
human assets. Taking account of all these considerations, CRT proposes an original vision of 
the nature and the boundaries of the firm, and suggests an original governance of the human 
capital-intensive organisation. 
 
3.2. CRT: Access, complementarity and specialisation of human assets 
CRT initially develops a conception of the firm as a ‘nexus of specific investments’ (Zingales, 
2000, p.1648) in human assets. On the basis of this renewed vision of the firm, we show that 
corporate governance practices necessarily change towards what we term the ‘multi-
resources’ governance of the firm. In other words, the coordination of human assets and of 
their complementarities is at the core of the analysis of the human capital-intensive firm and 
establishes a re-consideration of the principles and mechanisms of the governance of the firm. 
 
The firm as a nexus of specific human capital investments. 
On the basis of CRT, we conceptualise the division of tasks and power relationships within a 
human capital-intensive firm. A firm builds its productive activity on the critical resource 
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owned by any corporate member.
10
 This resource is decisive for the firm insofar as it 
enhances the development of its production process. 
 
On the one hand, the firm can influence its partners’ behaviour by regulating access to 
the critical resource. By providing some competent partners
11
 and some productive units with 
the right to use or to work with the critical resource (Rajan & Zingales, 1998), partners adjust 
their investments according to the interests of the firm in order not to jeopardise the joint 
value. The more partners invest in human capital, the more significant will be the rents to be 
shared within the coalition. They know that their rewards will be greater if they control the 
critical resource of the firm. Mutual dependence promotes the accumulation of specific human 
capital investments. 
 
On the other hand, by themselves specialising, partners become key elements of the 
productive activity of the firm on the basis of the complementarities built between the firm’s 
critical resource and the employees’ human capital. Mutual dependencies are a source of 
power because specific human assets cannot be redeployed outside the firm without a cost. 
 
In the critical resource framework, power comes from access to human capital that is 
critical for the firm’s production process. The rights of control on human capital are 
inalienable (Gibbons, 2005); therefore, control over human capital does not refer to 
ownership. Control over human capital depends rather on the regulation of access rights to a 
critical resource. A corporate member that is granted access does not acquire an additional 
residual right of decision; he or she can enhance their value by specialising in line with the 
firm’s process and its critical resource (Blair & Stout, 1999; Rajan & Zingales, 2001). 
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Access is a means by which each party can improve its economic power. On the one 
hand, through regulated access over time the firm improves its market valorisation and its 
growth opportunities. As it is a nexus of specific and complementary investments in human 
capital constituted of the productive team (Teece et al., 1997), the firm cannot be imitated 
instantaneously by real and/or potential competitors. Moreover, the more agents specialise, 
the more power is maintained and increased so that at some point, the firm becomes the nexus 
of the specific investments itself, i.e., the firm becomes the critical resource. According to 
Zingales (2000, p.1645) ‘what distinguishes the firm from the market is the web of specific 
investments built around a critical resource’. By giving up a part of its control to partners who 
are granted access to the critical resource, the firm loses some negotiation power. Therefore, 
on the other hand, valuable partners, who are granted access, control the nexus of critical 
resources so that they can multiply their outside opportunities. This power depends on the 
ability of partners to make firm-specific human capital investments. Partners control their own 
human capital and trade off specialisation to the firm against the exercise of outside options. 
The employees have the residual right to leave the firm. The simple threat to deprive the firm 
of specific human capital provides them with improved bargaining power. As they do not 
have alienable rights of control on the critical resource of the firm, partners do not have legal 
power in the firm. But, they do have a factual power on the basis of the control they are 
endowed with by using or working with, i.e. controlling, the critical resource of the firm. 
 
In other words, power relationships are reflected in the structural organisation and 
internal division of labour. The firm does not require other partners to develop their human 
capital excessively, because it wants its organisational rents to be protected. Thus, the firm 
defines and manages team work through synergies created by regulating access. In a 
symmetric way, partners search to enrich their tasks and to make firm-specific investments. 
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By specialising and accumulating knowledge and competencies, these individuals make 
themselves indispensable to the firm and enhance their outside value. The regulation of access 
is a privileged method to promote specific investments in human capital. The regulation of 
access to the critical resource, as a non-contractual
12
 agreement, is a superior mode of 
coordination to ownership in the particular case of the human capital-intensive firm.  
 
To summarise, therefore, whereas ownership legally associates physical assets to a 
firm, complementarities join human assets within a production team (Milgrom & Roberts, 
1992). The human capital-intensive firm can be viewed as a team organisation that 
coordinates productive co-specialisation. In other words, via the regulation of access, co-
specialisation and synergies arise from a team production in which each partner is decisive 
based on his or her specific human capital investments. 
 
In line with the Coasian approach to the firm, in a human capital-intensive firm 
coordination of productive activities is based on authority and power. However, the 
boundaries of the human capital-intensive firm are not precisely and definitively outlined. The 
boundaries of the human capital-intensive firm extend to all partners specialised in the 
productive entity, inside and outside its legal perimeter. Indeed, as this kind of firm is built on 
non-appropriable resources, its boundaries cannot be delimited on the basis of the structure of 
property rights. They should rather be defined as economic or functional boundaries on the 
basis of the power the firm gets by regulating access; the firm coordinates partners taking part 
in the productive activity inside and outside its legal boundaries. In this perspective, the 
institutional division of the coordination labour between the human capital-intensive firm and 
the market relationships system, is based on the absence of a (re)allocation of property rights 
within this kind of hierarchical organisation. In fact, employees are not granted legal rights of 
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control. Yet, such an allocation of property rights would promote the internal transfer of funds 
and resources to the most profitable productive divisions (Brusco & Panunzi, 2005). 
However, these productive divisions could change their investment behaviour to 
opportunistically protect their own interests. 
 
This analysis of the boundaries of the human capital-intensive firm combined with its 
particular mode of acquisition, of allocation and of exercise of power, suggests that a renewed 
vision of the governance of the firm should be developed (Porter-Liebeskind, 2000; Rajan & 
Zingales, 2000; Roberts & Van den Steen, 2000; Keenan & Aggestam, 2001). We thus 
propose a composite model of governance whose main objective is to maximise the ‘multi-
resource’ value of the firm. 
 
Objectives and operational modes of coordination of human capital: The multi-resources 
value. 
As the distinctive value of the human capital-intensive firm depends on resources that cannot 
be easily appropriated, its boundaries are often altered by the power of influential partners. 
Specialised partners have negotiating power by virtue of the mutual dependencies they have 
created. They can expropriate a large fraction of the value of the firm by developing outside 
opportunities.
13
 The risk of hold-up is high and the organisational form of the firm can be 
changed. In this context, the human capital-intensive firm has to develop a system of 
governance able to guarantee a satisfying alignment between the capacity to capture growth 
opportunities and the allocation of rents (Rajan & Zingales, 2000; Zingales, 2000). Because 
the possibility of renegotiation jeopardises long-term commitments, growth prospects are 
crucial in making the promise of future rents credible. As power and rents are not 
concentrated, but diffused among multiple key partners, even outside the legal boundaries of 
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the firm (as for subcontractors essential to the firm), the main objective of the governance of 
the human capital-intensive firm is to protect the integrity of the firm. 
 
The organisational mode of governance has to change. Focusing on the firm built 
around its human assets, investigations have to study mechanisms that give to the hierarchical 
organisation of the firm the power to motivate, to control, and above all to retain specific 
human capital in order to maximise its value. Partners have to be provided with incentives to 
continue their relationship with the firm so that the firm can retain the wealth indispensable to 
its productive activity. Corporate governance does not deal only with efficient modes of 
resolving conflicts in order to maximise shareholder or stakeholder value. The governance of 
the firm consists of encouraging key partners not to quit the firm and to make firm-specific 
human capital investments. The governance of the human capital-intensive firm that we 
describe in this paper as the ‘multi-resources model’ recognises specialised partners as 
complementary valuable resources that enhance the value of the firm and ensure its durability. 
The final objective of the multi-resources model is to maximise the value of the various 
critical intangible assets owned by key employees and other partners in the nexus of specific 
investments, i.e. to maximise the multi-resources value. 
 
The multi-resources model is based on a set of instruments of coordination.
14
 The 
governance of the human capital-intensive firm can be described as a composite model built 
on an association of standard mechanisms (used in the shareholder model or/and in the 
stakeholder model) and innovative practices that take into account the inalienable and non-
transferable nature of human capital. These practices can affect either extrinsic or intrinsic 
motivation (Deci, 1975; Kreps, 1997; Osterloh & Frey, 2000; Bénabou & Tirole, 2003).
15
 
Intangible critical resources can be incited, co-specialised and retained on the basis of a 
 19 
combination of different coordinating and regulatory mechanisms whose use proportion 
depends (notably) on the hierarchical structure and the functional boundaries of the firm. 
Table 1 summarises the major attributes of the multi-resources view compared to the 
shareholder and the stakeholder approaches. 
 
<Table 1 here> 
 
Firstly, beyond their traditional role of financing, outside equities can lock in 
relationships among stakeholders (Myers, 2000). By ensuring an attractive distribution of 
outside equities, the firm can protect its long-term viability. The solution is to associate key 
partners (mainly employees here) with the financial capital structure of the firm and, thus, to 
provide them with power (Frye, 2004). The idea is to preserve the firm as a nexus of specific 
investments, by promoting the alignment of partners’ interests. This modality of governance 
within the human capital-intensive firm would reduce potential sources of conflicts. 
 
Secondly, as job rotation and temporary specialised labour markets have increased, 
corporate members tend to be more volatile. They improve their negotiating power. 
Appropriate incentives, for example, profit-sharing, have to be developed to encourage 
partners’ efforts at good corporate performance and to ensure their loyalty. Therefore, the 
generalised awarding of stock options to employees continues to be an important regulation 
means to compensate and to retain employees (Ittner et al., 2003; Oyer & Schaefer, 2005). 
While the rights of control associated with ownership may have diminished, the role of 
ownership in coordinating partners may have increased. Moreover, participative management 
and organisational design can interact with ownership in order to minimise hold-up problems 
in human capital. 
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Thirdly, within the firm, the collective participation of employees in decision 
processes is an important motivating method insofar as it partly affects the subordination 
relationships among employer and employees (Goodijk, 2000). Better board and committee 
representation of employees is part of this corporate governance method (Luoma & 
Goodstein, 1997; Hillman et al., 2001). Information rights, consultation rights, and co-
management rights strengthen employees’ power. 
 
Fourthly, team production supports the multi-resources mode of governance. By 
working together, specialised employees interact and strengthen the complementarity of their 
own critical human capital. The more employees increase the value of their firm-specific 
human capital, the more it is costly to redeploy this human capital outside the firm and 
employees continue to be retained by the firm. 
 
Fifthly, an increased vertical and horizontal communication among employees through 
hierarchical intermediaries is a solution to optimally coordinating employees within the 
organisation. In other words, hierarchy can yield power to employees that occupy middle 
positions in the hierarchy by providing them with control over some resources.
16
 Being given 
a higher position in the hierarchy is synonymous with the higher rents that employees can 
appropriate. Thus, these employees strengthen their relationships with the firm (Rajan & 
Zingales, 2001). 
 
Lastly, setting up a system of job rotation could reduce hold-up problems for the human 
capital-intensive firm (Halonen-Akatwijuka, 2004). Basically, specialised employees with 
task-specific human capital are indispensable because nobody else can perform their jobs. 
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Hold-up threat is great and should be limited. Rotation removes the hold-up power originating 
in human capital because other employees are able to perform the same job. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The objective of this paper was to reinstate the link between two fields of analysis 
traditionally investigated separately – the boundaries of the firm, and governance of the firm – 
on the basis of an extensive analysis of the human capital-intensive firm. 
The outcomes obtained are as follow. 
 
Firstly, the link between the two fields of analysis appears with the emergence of the 
Modern Theory of the Firm, i.e. with the seminal work of Coase (1937).  
 
Secondly, the contractual framework develops a restrictive conception of the firm as a 
unified structure of property rights over physical assets. However, since the mid 1980s, the 
structure and the organisation of the firm, and also the power relationships between the firm 
and its internal and external partners have changed. The growing importance of human capital 
in the productive activity of firms is at the core of these mutations. Nevertheless, the central 
dimension of human capital is frequently neglected by economists writing about the firm. 
 
Thirdly, CRT is the first approach to the firm that recognises human capital as the 
asset decisive to its competitiveness. It establishes an original analysis of the human capital-




Fourthly, what we term the multi-resources view in this paper is based on original 
mechanisms of acquisition, allocation and exercise of power in a firm defined as a nexus of 
specific human capital investments. Because of the immaterial and non-transferable nature of 
knowledge, talents and competencies, the boundaries of the human capital-intensive firm are 
economically defined on the basis of regulation of access to the activities coordinated by the 
firm. Therefore, the multi-resources model of governance of the firm aims to incentivise 
internal and external partners that work in teams to co-specialise within the firm and not to 
leave it. 
 
Lastly, a model of creation and repartition (or appropriation) of the multi-resources 
value is developed on the basis of the operational instruments of coordination. The multi-
resources model reduces efficiency losses due to underinvestment resulting from human 
assets specificity and underlying hold-up risks. 
 
These outcomes do not exhaust the research agenda related to the link between the 
nature, boundaries and governance of the firm, referred to in this paper on the basis of the 
emergence of the human-capital intensive firm. In order to go deeply into the multi-resources 
model, we need an empirical evaluation of human capital-intensive firm behaviour in terms of 
work organisation and incentives and control methods. Correlations between the multi-
resources model and firm performance are needed. Theoretically, CRT is a first step towards a 
renewed Modern Theory of the Firm in developing an original vision of the firm while 
suggesting a corresponding model of firm governance. Future research should extend this 
approach by studying in depth some theoretical concepts, including human assets specificity 
compared to physical assets specificity, and the associated underlying coordination problems. 
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Future research should develop a general (not a particular) theory of the firm associated to a 
theory of corporate governance applicable to all types of firms. 
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Notes 
                                               
1
 The solutions often involve strengthening shareholders’ control rights and ability to 
negotiate contractual restraints on manager opportunism. 
2
 Competencies, know-how and expertise, i.e. human capital, associated to a work 
organisation based on technologies and team production, are at the core of the productive 
activity of business services and computer engineering firms. 
3
 According to Williamson, a governance structure is a contractual mechanism in charge of 
transactions (for more details, see Williamson, 1991). 
4
 Williamson reduces the firm to vertical integration which according to him is the 
‘paradigmatic problem’ (Williamson, 1985, p. 150). 
5
 We study this question in depth in the next section of the paper. 
6
 Information and communication technologies are at the core of the recent technological 
revolution (Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1999; Hobijn & Jovanovic, 2001; Brynjolfsson et al., 
2002). 
7
 For a complete survey of stakeholder theory, see Donaldson & Preston (1995). 
8
 Stakeholders are groups of individuals who have legal rights on and duties in the firm. 
Stakeholders include shareholders, managers, creditors, employees, customers, suppliers, etc. 
and each of these families of economic agents owns critical resources and expects in turn that 
their interests will be satisfied (Freeman, 1984). 
9
 Yet, some authors try to overcome this theoretical failure by developing a stakeholder vision 
of the firm based on ICT raising the question of the nature and the boundaries of the firm 
(Mahoney et al., 2005). 
10
 A critical resource can originate in the talent or particular skill of one of the firm’s agents 
(the entrepreneur, a manager or another key employee). The critical resource can be a specific 
human capital and not a physical or an alienable capital. 
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11
 We use the terms partners, stakeholders and employees interchangeably, to indicate 
corporate members whose characteristics are possession of human capital critical to the 
productive activity of the firm. 
12
 Regulation of access includes not only access rights to the critical resource, but also the 
cooperation of the person that is specialised to. Moreover, regulation of access is not only a 
momentary action, but a ‘process that cannot be continuously verified by courts’ (Rajan & 
Zingales, 1998, p.403). 
13
 This hold-up manifestation is significant because 71% of the firms recorded in the Inc 500 
list were founded by talented employees who imitated or changed a growth opportunity built 
by their former employing firm (Bhide, 2000). 
14
 The list of governance mechanisms examined is not exhaustive. The paper mentions the 
more relevant ones. 
15
 Extrinsic motivation is achieved by actions that result in the attainment of externally 
tangible and intangible rewards, including pay, promotion, material possessions, prestige and 
the positive evaluations of others. Intrinsic motivation, on the other hand, is based on 
engagement in an activity for its own sake rather than to obtain material or social 
compensation. Moreover, motivations can be described along a control-to-autonomy 
continuum, from extrinsic motivations towards intrinsic ones (Gagné & Deci, 2005). 
16
 In some cases, these resources are employees occupying low positions in the hierarchy. 
